

14 FEB 1973

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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# **TRENDS**

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
14 FEBRUARY 1973

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 FEBRUARY 1973

<u>Moscow (2936 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1149 items)</u>		
Vietnam	(28%)	13%	Domestic Issues	(33%)	52%
50th Anniversary of	(--)	8%	Cambodia	(12%)	15%
Aeroflot			[Sihanouk in DRV	(2%)	9%]
China	(2%)	6%	Vietnam	(39%)	7%
Egyptian Presidential	(--)	5%	25th Anniversary of	(--)	6%
Adviser Hafiz			DPRK Army		
Isma'il in USSR			Dismissal of USSR	(--)	3%
European Security	(2%)	3%	Agriculture Minister		
			DPRK Foreign Minister	(--)	3%
			Ho Tam in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

North Vietnam broke an almost complete silence on Presidential adviser Kissinger's 10-13 February visit to Hanoi when it released, on the 14th, the U.S.-DRV joint communique reporting that the two sides had held "frank, serious, and constructive exchanges." The communique went beyond the language of the peace agreement and of previous Hanoi statements in advocating the "normalization" of relations between the two countries. Problems in carrying out the agreement were reflected in the communique's report that the two sides had discussed measures to "improve and expedite" its implementation.

Hanoi and the Front have accused Saigon of attempting to sabotage the peace agreement by continuing military operations, denying civil liberties, and hampering the Joint Military Commission. Official protests, in DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements, particularly deplored an attack by a South Vietnamese crowd on a regional contingent of the DRV military delegation. While most of the communist criticism has focused on GVN actions, the United States has been scored for "protecting" the GVN and a PRG statement accused Washington of violating the agreement's stipulation that foreign bases in South Vietnam be dismantled.

Both Moscow and Peking have been relying largely on Vietnamese sources in their current coverage, after having given the highest-level endorsement of the Vietnam settlement. Moscow has also been pressing its call for Asian collective security, and a SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article on the 8th took the "Chinese hegemonists" to task for obstructing the trend toward detente. The Chinese foreign minister, in a speech welcoming his North Korean counterpart on the 9th, briefly hailed the Vietnam agreement and referred to a growing struggle in the third world against "power politics and hegemonism."

## JOINT COMMUNIQUE MARKS CONCLUSION OF KISSINGER VISIT TO HANOI

Prior to the 14 February release of the U.S.-DRV communique, Hanoi media reported on Kissinger's 10-13 February visit to Hanoi only in brief accounts of his arrival and departure. Satisfaction with the U.S.-DRV talks had seemed reflected, however, in a DRV announcement earlier on the 14th that a decision had been taken during Kissinger's visit to release 20 U.S. POW's ahead of schedule. The announcement said the early release was "an act of good will and another indication of the seriousness on the part of the DRV Government in the implementation of the signed agreement."

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The joint communique reported that Kissinger had been received by Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, and Nguyen Duy Trinh and that the two sides had "frank, serious, and constructive exchanges of views" on implementing the peace agreement, postwar relations between the two countries, and "other subjects of mutual concern." The communique seemed to reflect concern over developments since the signing of the accord when it indicated that the discussions touched on "imperative measures" which should be taken to "improve and expedite" the implementation of the agreement. It noted that the two sides would "continue to have periodic exchanges of views in order to ensure" the strict and scrupulous implementation of the accord, and it stated that such implementation would contribute in a positive way to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

The communique also envisaged machinery to continue bilateral contacts on economic questions, noting that the two sides had agreed to establish a joint economic commission charged with the task of developing bilateral economic relations. It echoed the language of the peace agreement when it reported that views were also exchanged on the manner in which the United States will "contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar economic reconstruction in North Vietnam."

On the issue of future U.S.-DRV relations, the communique went further than the peace agreement, which had noted that its implementation would "create conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship" between the two countries. The communique stated that during Kissinger's visit the two sides had "examined concrete steps which can be taken to normalize the relations between the two countries." The value of such "normalization" was underlined in three principles advocated to govern relations: 1) that the peace agreement be fully and scrupulously implemented, 2) that the relationship be based on respect for independence and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefit, and 3) that "the normalization of the relations . . . will help to ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia." While Kissinger, in his 24 January press conference on the peace agreement, had indicated that "it is our firm intention in our relationship to the DRV to move from hostility to normalization and from normalization to conciliation and cooperation," comment in Hanoi media since the signing of the accord has not until now referred to normalization of relations. The DRV's 28 January party-government appeal on the agreement typified Hanoi comment in its general statement that "it is the

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sincere desire of our government and people to entertain friendly relations with all countries, including the United States of America, on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and of equality and mutual benefit."

OTHER COMMENT ON U.S.      Vietnamese communist protests over alleged violations of the peace accord have focused their criticism on GVN behavior while noting the United States is also responsible. A 10 February PRG Foreign Ministry statement, however, took the United States to task for being "unwilling to dismantle all military bases of its own and of other foreign countries in South Vietnam as stipulated in the agreement, using the pretext that these have been turned over to the Saigon administration." A 12 February DRV Foreign Ministry statement endorsed the PRG statement without raising the issue of bases but did spell out U.S. responsibility in strong terms:

As a signatory to the agreement, the U.S. Government has the responsibility and the duty to respect and strictly implement it and its protocols and stop harboring and protecting the Saigon administration, which has violated the agreement.

On a lower level, the Vietnamese communists' relatively positive attitude toward the United States was illustrated in the 7 February Liberation Radio report on the first two meetings of the heads of the JMC delegations. The report pictured GVN representative Ngo Dzu as embarrassed and as arguing weakly in the face of communist protests at the second session. By contrast, U.S. representative General Woodward was praised by the Front radio for his courtesy, for taking the initiative in offering his hand, and for "having the bearing of a diplomat rather than a military man."

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## DRV, PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES PROTEST GVN "SABOTAGE" OF ACCORD

Foreign Ministry statements from the DRV and PRG on the 10th and again from the DRV on the 12th protested alleged Saigon violations of the peace agreement, among other things accusing the GVN of carrying out some 100 military operations a day since the start of the cease-fire. They also charged Saigon with having denied liberties guaranteed in the agreement, including the right of refugees to return home.

JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION      Saigon's treatment of the communist representatives on the four-party

Joint Military Commission (JMC) drew fire in all three foreign ministry statements. The communists' complaints were set forth in the 10 February DRV Foreign Ministry statement, pegged to an incident the previous day in Ban Me Thuot, Darlac Province, in which DRV members of a JMC contingent were allegedly "assaulted" and injured by a crowd led by South Vietnamese policemen. The statement charged that the GVN had arranged the "hooligan act" in order to "sabotage the cease-fire, peace, and the spirit of national reconciliation and concord." It condemned the GVN for other actions which it said had caused difficulties for the JMC, among other things charging that the quarters for the communist delegations were inadequate and that their food supplies had been restricted "with a view to jeopardizing the health of the members of the two delegations."

The DRV protest of the 10th likened current incidents to actions by Ngo Dinh Diem "aimed at sabotaging the 1954 Geneva agreements." It charged that the "manhandling" of the DRV personnel "is aimed at impeding the work of the principal machinery ensuring the implementation of the agreement" and is an "utterly serious encroachment" on the agreement. The statement called upon the GVN to punish those responsible for the Ban Me Thout incident and to ensure the safety of the DRV and PRG representatives. The DRV protest was echoed in the PRG Foreign Ministry statement, which added several other complaints including the allegation that Saigon had hampered the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).

Also on 10 February, a statement by Maj. Gen. Le Quang Hoa, head of the DRV military delegation to the JMC, carried forward the DRV protest of the Ban Me Thuot incident by announcing: "Pending an answer from the United States and the GVN, we will temporarily stop sending out our officers and personnel. It is

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only just that the United States and the GVN will have to answer for the delay in the posting of the regional JMC teams." Hoa called for an investigation by a four-party team and demanded that the United States as well as the GVN "guarantee the absolute security of the personnel of this team and provide them all necessary assistance and cooperation."

Aside from the protests over the treatment given their representatives to the JMC, the DRV and PRG have given only selective, delayed publicity to the activities of the military commission. Some details of the 2 and 4 February JMC meetings were reported on the 7th by Liberation Radio, which indicated that at the second session both the DRV and PRG representatives protested alleged harassment of their delegations. The broadcast quoted PLAF Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra as commenting: "You must know what our liberation armed forces will think if they learn about such treatment."

**PRISONERS** The 10 February PRG Foreign Ministry statement put on the record communist criticism of Saigon's policies toward both civilian and military prisoners. It denounced the GVN for refusing to hand over some 10,000 military prisoners on the "pretext" that they had rallied to the GVN--a complaint previously made in a Liberation Radio broadcast on the 8th. The broadcast had rejected as "nonsensical" the GVN's justification for setting these prisoners free rather than handing them over--the claim that the POW's had sent a letter to Thieu asking to be permitted to defect and that Thieu had complied by signing an order for their release on 25 January, three days before the cease-fire. The 10 February statement also scored Saigon for admitting to hold only some 2,000 civilian prisoners; "public opinion at home and abroad knows that this figure must reach hundreds of thousands," the statement said.

Efforts to return communist prisoners in South Vietnam on 12 February were noted the following day in a VNA report that said the PRG had received 100 of its military personnel at Bien Hoa. VNA charged that most of the prisoners were in poor condition due to mistreatment and that, because of their experiences, they refused to believe they were to be freed until they had met with the PRG and DRV JMC representatives.

An authorized statement from the LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA), broadcast on 14 February, denied Saigon's charge that the communists had refused to receive 100 prisoners who were to be handed over in Quang Tri on the 12th. LPA maintained that the PRG was ready to receive the POW's but that Saigon had postponed the release until 14 February.

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**HANOI GIVES FURTHER PUBLICITY TO LE DUAN'S TET VISITS**

Hanoi media have continued to carry late reports on the Tet activities of DRV leaders, with broadcasts on 9 and 10 February describing Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan's visit to the Quang Binh-Vinh Linh area. Speaking to army units on 3 February, Le Duan dealt with the problems of redirecting the army's tasks in the "new situation," particularly in regard to their relationships with civilians. The army must now "serve the people . . . , love the people, protect the property of the people and state, and stand ready to make sacrifices for the people," he said, and he stressed repeatedly that army members should not consider themselves worthy of special consideration because of their part in the war. Le Duan was said to have told one group:

We should not boast about the service we have rendered, nor should we claim privileges, position, or rank. To boast about one's service to the fatherland and people and to claim privileges from the revolution, the fatherland, and the people at the present moment is a cruel act. Indeed, nothing is more cruel than claiming remuneration for services rendered while scores of thousands of compatriots and comrades have sacrificed themselves for the revolution.

In his talks to army units, Le Duan also expressed thanks to "the fraternal countries and our friends throughout the world" for their support, which he termed "a very important factor for the success of our people's revolutionary undertaking." At the same time, he stressed the role of the VWP's "solidarity and single-mindedness" in achieving the victory: "The more we are united and single-minded at any turning point in the history of our revolution," he said, "the more we can take pride in our party's independent, correct, and creative line and our people's stalwartness, bravery, intelligence, and vividness."

Among other Le Duan appearances, the radio reported that he talked with a group of "his native compatriots" and paid special attention to the struggle of those from Trieu Phong district, thereby suggesting that Trieu Phong--in South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province--may be Le Duan's birthplace. He reportedly declared that "for 18 years" that district as well as "the

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entire South [had] remained staunch, unsubmitive, and unswervingly loyal." It was unclear whether the "compatriots" Le Duan was addressing had lived in the DRV for some time or were relatively recent arrivals; he urged them, in any event, to "engage industriously in production" in the future.

#### MOSCOW PRESSES ADVOCACY OF ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY

In the wake of the Vietnam agreement, Moscow may be seeking to breathe new life into its proposal for an Asian collective security system as a means of consolidating the postwar situation and preserving Soviet influence in the area. Brezhnev, who had floated the proposal as a trial balloon in his address to the June 1969 Moscow international party conference, observed in his 30 January speech at the Kremlin dinner honoring Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh that a possibility now arises for easing tension in Asia as has taken place in Europe. Brezhnev spoke only in general terms, but subsequent Soviet comment assessing the broader implications of the Vietnam settlement has pressed the claim that prospects for an Asian collective security system have brightened in the light of the Vietnam agreement.

This point was made in V. Kudryavtsev's 6 February IZVESTIYA commentary portraying a favorable atmosphere for Asian detente and calling for postwar cooperation in aiding Vietnam.\* Perhaps regarding it unseemly in this context to attack Peking directly, Kudryavtsev complained that unspecified "maoist groups" have not desisted from their efforts to denigrate Soviet aid and to obstruct socialist internationalist solidarity. Earlier, a harshly anti-Chinese article by V. Vasin in the 3 February RED STAR accused Peking directly of seeking to divide the socialist camp and of opposing the idea of collective security in Asia.

In the fullest recent treatment of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in a post-Vietnam context, an 8 February SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by V. Pavlovskiy contrasted Peking's pronouncements welcoming the Vietnam agreement with reported remarks by Chou En-lai to the effect that there will not be genuine peace in Asia because of Soviet efforts to establish hegemony in the area. Pavlovskiy cited Chou as having reportedly said that the Soviet Union is striving to subordinate China by means of an Asian collective security system.

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\*See the TRENDS of 7 February 1973, page 12.

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In answering why Peking is now engaging in such "improper activities" at a time when maximum cooperation is required to consolidate and broaden the progress achieved in Vietnam, Pavlovskiy quoted the Western press as saying that the Chinese wish for the United States to maintain its military presence in Asia and that U.S. strategists are reconsidering plans for a considerable reduction of this presence. According to Pavlovskiy, Peking's moves represent an effort to maintain tension in Asia for the sake of pursuing its "great-power and hegemonic aims." The article concluded by quoting Brezhnev's 30 January call for Asian detente following the example of Europe.

In discussing Asian collective security Moscow has been generally silent on the U.S. attitude, though a Mayevskiy/Strelnikov dispatch from Washington carried in PRAVDA on 8 February claimed that fresh interest in the Soviet proposal has arisen in the United States since the Vietnam agreement. The dispatch acknowledged that some people regard the proposal as premature and that others, such as Senator Javits, believe that talks should be conducted on a bloc basis.

The Kudryavtsev article contained an allusion that seems mainly aimed at the Japanese and their well-publicized interest in taking an important role in Vietnam aid. Kudryavtsev said that "certain big monopolists" are dreaming of penetrating the Indochina economy under the guise of aid and of establishing their economic supremacy in Southeast Asia.

**POLISH COMMENT** Poland, one of the ICCS members, may be serving as a Soviet proxy spokesman in raising issues concerning the search for a new power balance in Southeast Asia. An article in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on 12 February depicted favorable possibilities for cooperation between the two superpowers in strengthening international security. It also claimed that the DRV's authority has been strengthened and that Hanoi will play a stronger role in determining affairs in Indochina.

An article in the Polish daily SLOWO POWSZECHNE on the 13th raised the question of Sino-U.S. relations as a factor in an Indochina settlement. The article said that China has not yet defined its role in Indochina and that it is not known on what terms Peking will take part in the forthcoming international conference in Paris. Taking account of the triangular big-power relationship, the article noted that Peking issued a virulent attack on the Brezhnev leadership ten days before Kissinger's scheduled arrival in China. It added, however, that the United States "is fully aware" that an Indochina settlement "must include Soviet guarantees."

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## D P R K - C H I N A

### PYONGYANG WARY ON VIETNAM AGREEMENT, ASIAN SITUATION

Against the background of Pyongyang's hesitant, lukewarm reaction to the Vietnam settlement, North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam arrived in Peking on the 9th for talks that seemed timed to provide an exchange of views prior to Dr. Kissinger's visit to China from 15 to 19 February. Pyongyang may be concerned over the implications of the Vietnam agreement for its own interests as an unsatisfied power in a divided country. The North Koreans had been among the most vociferous hardliners on the Vietnam conflict, mirroring their militant approach to the Korean question. Though they have taken a more conciliatory stance on Korean reunification in the past year, they may feel that the communists gained inadequate political leverage in the Vietnam settlement as measured against Pyongyang's demands for broader political contacts in the North-South Korean negotiations. Pyongyang may thus have desired to present its interests and to coordinate with Peking in anticipation of the new round of Sino-U.S. consultations.

Pyongyang's cautious reaction to the Vietnam settlement also came at a time when the North-South Korean talks seem to have stalled. A tougher line toward South Korea has marked Pyongyang's comment in recent weeks, perhaps reflecting misgivings over the extent to which the negotiations can further the North's interests. The gap since the latest, fourth session of the Red Cross talks has now reached twice the length of the longest previous interval between sessions. Also, no date has been set for the second meeting of the North-South Coordinating Committee, which had its first formal session on 30 November and 1 December in Seoul. (The South Korean cochairman had said at a 2 December press conference that the second session was expected to be held "sometime in February.")

The rise in Pyongyang's criticism of the activities of the "South Korean authorities" has been marked by a polemical tone comparable to that which prevailed prior to a 10 November meeting of the coordinating committee cochairmen at which the two sides agreed to discontinue propaganda broadcasts against one another. Other elements of a tougher approach have been evident, as in a 3 February DPRK Foreign Ministry statement

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assailing planned military exercises in the South and accusing the United States of preparing a "new war" in Korea.

Pyongyang withheld comment on the Vietnam agreement until 30 January, when leaders' messages and an editorial in the party organ NODONG SINMUN hailed the agreement as a "great victory" for the Vietnamese comrades. Unlike the Soviet and Chinese messages, which included the full panoply of party and state leaderships, the message to the DRV from President Kim Il-song and Premier Kim Il was addressed only on the government level. The message to the DRV said the signing of the agreement represented an "ignominious defeat" for the United States and that the Vietnamese had made a great contribution to the "anti-imperialist, revolutionary struggle" of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples. Both this message and one to the PRG wished the Vietnamese success in achieving peaceful reunification, the latter one additionally referring to the South Vietnamese struggle to "carry the national liberation revolution through to completion."

The NODONG SINMUN editorial was notably harsher toward the United States than Soviet and Chinese comment on the agreement has been. Unlike Pyongyang's two big communist allies, the editorial did not view the agreement as contributing to a reduction of tension in Asia, and it took the occasion to call President Nixon an "imperialist war chieftain" and to excoriate "the U.S. imperialist murderers" for having exceeded Hitler's crimes. The editorial also took a pessimistic view of the prospects of peace in Vietnam and directed attention to the continuing U.S. military presence in the region. Charging that the United States is obstructing Korean unification, the editorial demanded an American withdrawal from South Korea, Indochina, Taiwan, Japan, and the rest of Asia.

#### CHINESE, NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFER IN PEKING

North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam held talks with his Chinese counterpart, Chi Peng-fei, on strengthening bilateral relations and on international questions of "common interest." NCNA described the atmosphere of the talks as "very cordial and friendly," Peking's standard formula for relations with its close allies. The visitor also met twice with Chou En-lai for "very cordial" conversations, and he was honored at a

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dinner on 10 February hosted by Chou, Politburo alternate member Li Te-sheng, and Chi. The usual welcoming and reciprocal banquets by the respective foreign ministers provided occasions for comment on current developments. Ho Tam left Peking on the 12th for a provincial trip before continuing on to Pakistan.

Both sides declared that they reached a unanimity of views on topics discussed, an assessment also made at the time of Chi's visit to Pyongyang in late December. However, in their comments the two sides reflected divergent interests, with the Chinese focusing on the Korean question as such while the North Korean side demanded U.S. withdrawal from all of Asia. Peking's concern over the Soviets was expressed obliquely in Chi's reference to a growing struggle in the third world against "power politics and hegemonism," a formulation having anti-Soviet overtones in particular at a time when the Chinese are muting or avoiding attacks on the U.S. overseas presence. Chi declared that China and Korea are as close as "one family," thus drawing on the image of Asian unity that Mao used when he told Madame Binh on 29 December that China, South and North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Korea are "all of the same family." The idea of an Asian family also implicitly excludes the Soviets.

In his welcoming speech on the 9th, Chi described the Korean question as "one of the important factors causing tension in Asia," thus suggesting that Peking regards the Korean question as high on the agenda in the wake of the Vietnam agreement. Previously, Peking had cited the Vietnam conflict as a primary cause of Asian tension, and the Chinese welcomed the Vietnam settlement as an important contribution to detente. Having raised the question of a Korean settlement, Chi termed it "most urgent" that favorable conditions be created for peaceful reunification of Korea and called for the United States to withdraw its troops and for UNCURK to be abolished.

In his reply, Ho Tam welcomed Chi's support for these demands and praised Peking's "active and many-sided support and backing" for Pyongyang's socialist construction and struggle for Korean unification. He went on, however, to draw a lesson from the Vietnam experience that Peking has not presented, echoing the 30 January editorial's demand that the United States withdraw not only from Indochina but also from South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and all other parts of Asia. He also went beyond the Chinese in denouncing U.S. moves to modernize the South Korean army and in deploring calls by "certain South Korean forces" to secure a superiority of strength vis-a-vis the North.

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Earlier, an 8 February LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, marking the anniversary of the North Korean army's founding, juxtaposed praise for the Vietnam agreement and for "new progress" that has been made toward Korean reunification since publication of the North-South joint statement last July. The editorial took these developments as signs of an "increasingly favorable" situation in Asia. It expressed confidence that the Koreans could overcome obstacles on the road to reunification, noting mildly that the United States "is continuing to obstruct" this road. In a reflection of Chinese sensitivity to North Korean militancy on the subject, the NCNA domestic service's account of a speech on the 7th by a North Korean military attache in Peking deleted a passage contained in the NCNA international service version in which he declared that the North Koreans would resolutely wipe out any aggressors who dared to commit armed aggression.

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## USSR - PHILIPPINES - CHINA

## MOSCOW EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR MARCOS; ATTACKS U.S., CHINESE

Moscow has sought to capitalize on current political developments in the Philippines, including the imposition of martial law last September and the recent referendum calling for a new constitution, in its campaign to enhance the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia during a period of change and realignment in the region. The Soviets have continued to press their propaganda effort to arouse nationalist sentiment against American influence in the Philippines while holding out the prospects of ties with the USSR as a counterweight that would strengthen Manila's independence. In a bid for President Marcos' favor, Moscow has found justification for the imposition of martial law and has expressed support for announced land reform and other social and economic measures. Implicitly condoning the moves toward one-man rule, Moscow has maintained that the present Philippine constitution too closely reflects "imposed" U.S. institutional forms and favorably reported the outcome of the January referendum for a new constitution. Hailing the referendum results, IZVESTIYA commentator Popov on 19 January contended that the change would produce "a more positive orientation" of Philippine society.

In the jockeying for influence in the Philippines and regionally, Moscow has also made a point of denigrating the Chinese as a negative actor in the country's affairs. Typically, Soviet reaction to the declaration of martial law included charges that CIA agents and "Maoist elements" were involved in a coup attempt against Marcos, and Moscow has portrayed both reactionary and pro-Peking forces as inimical to the government's efforts to implement needed reforms. Where Peking has remained silent in face of the Manila government's charges that Maoist elements have been behind terrorist activities, Moscow has naturally lent its voice to these charges in pursuing its rivalry with Peking for influence over the split Philippine communist movement.

**U.S. POSITION** In its propaganda campaign to arouse demands for curtailment of the U.S. presence Moscow has portrayed the American legacy as providing imperialist prerogatives for the United States, has publicized anti-U.S. incidents, and has accused the United States of exploiting the economy and exercising undue influence on the determination of Manila's

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foreign policy. A Moscow radio commentary on 24 January said the decision to alter the form of government in the Philippines "is only one of the recent factors pointing to the Filipinos' wish to be rid of the U.S. influence." The commentator added that the people were beginning to realize "what a fatal influence" the treaties with the United States had on the country and thus were demanding the termination of "secret treaties" and the closure of U.S. military bases.

**RELATIONS WITH USSR** With Marcos proceeding cautiously on the question of diplomatic relations with communist countries, having thus far recognized only the independent-minded Yugoslavia and Romania, Moscow has seized on current developments in the country to press its advocacy of the benefits of ties with the Soviet Union. IZVESTIYA's Popov, observing that the new constitution lifted restrictions on contacts with communist countries, attributed to Philippine observers the view that the change would open the way to the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union. Earlier, PRAVDA on 10 December reported that Marcos had met on the previous day with I.F. Shpedko, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's section dealing with the Philippines. The brief PRAVDA report did not indicate the subject, but a Manila radio account said Marcos told the visitor that the Philippines favored normalization of relations with all countries.

Unofficial exchanges between the USSR and the Philippines, including visits and minor trade agreements, have been taking place in the past seven years. Acknowledging that progress toward formal relations would take time, IZVESTIYA political observer and Supreme Soviet deputy Vladimir Kudryavtsev wrote on 26 May 1971 that during a meeting with Marcos in Manila the Philippine president had said he supported recognition but that such an important move would require "prudence and gradualness." On 21 May 1972 SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reported that a Philippines-USSR Friendship Society had been founded in Manila on the initiative of Mrs. Marcos, who was named honorary chairman. After his wife's visit to the USSR in March that year at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Manila radio quoted Marcos as saying recognition was being studied by "the top advisory committee on foreign affairs."

Last December the first delegation of Intourist officials to visit the Philippines discussed the establishment of direct links with the Philippine Tourist Association and other tourist

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companies. The head of the delegation and chairman of the board of Intourist later was reported by a Moscow radio broadcast to Asia as having said that a direct air link between Moscow and Manila was scheduled to begin in the spring. Moscow recently succeeded in obtaining permission for the permanent assignment of a correspondent in the Philippines. On 9 December the Manila radio reported the presence of PRAVDA's first correspondent, Vladimir Grigorovich, whose initial Manila-dated dispatch appeared in PRAVDA on 2 January.\*

PHILIPPINE CP Moscow has recently been devoting more publicity to the pro-Soviet wing of the Philippine communists (CPP). In 1965 Moscow publicized the party's line that revolution could be achieved through peaceful means, but Soviet media virtually ignored the CPP through the rest of the decade. The party was thought to be one of the two "clandestine" parties represented at the June 1969 Moscow conference, but Moscow did not identify it. The CPP was not among the parties reported by Moscow to have sent representatives to the Lenin centenary celebrations in April 1970 or the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971. On 12 April 1971, however, Moscow broadcast the text of a message of greeting to the congress from the CPP. By the time of the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations last December, the party was acknowledged by Moscow as a participant in the activities. On 28 December PRAVDA published the text of a speech by an unnamed representative of the CPP at a meeting marking the anniversary. The speech reflected a more critical stance toward the government than that being taken by Moscow, as in the statement that the CPP was backing efforts to demand the lifting of martial law and was "tirelessly urging the people to prepare for any eventualities and for a lengthy and difficult struggle." Nonetheless, the speaker maintained that the CPP's struggle enjoyed the support of "the Soviet communists and Soviet people."

Moscow's rivalry with Peking for control over communist parties has also figured in the Soviet treatment of recent developments in the Philippines. The Soviets have accused the Maoist faction, known as the New People's Army, of responsibility for terrorist activities and have implicated Peking in these activities. A

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\* TASS apparently does not have a correspondent stationed in Manila. There have been infrequent TASS dispatches with a Manila dateline, but pertinent dispatches about the Philippines are still being filed from such cities as Singapore.

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Soviet commentary broadcast to Asia on 28 January detailed Peking's role in causing the split in the Philippine party in 1969 and alleged that "the rash policies and provocative activities of the pro-Mao group" were responsible for the arrest under martial law of leading trade union functionaries, who were the "champions of the workers' interests, and for the undermining of efforts to end the island's dependence on the overseas imperialists."

Popov's IZVESTIYA commentary charged that terrorist activities of Maoist elements were causing the "chaos" in the Philippines to the detriment of "the democratic, anti-imperialist movement." A Grigorovich dispatch in PRAVDA on 9 January extended the charge by adding that these activities had "Peking's blessing." A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to Asia on 16 November had gone further by citing an AFP dispatch saying that some members of the terrorist groups had fled to China after martial law had been imposed.

#### PEKING REMAINS DISCREETLY QUIET ON PHILIPPINE EVENTS

Consistent with its efforts to improve relations with Southeast Asian countries while muting involvement with native Maoist insurrectionists, Peking has been discreet and unprovocative in its coverage of Philippine developments, avoiding direct comment and generally skirting attacks on the Marcos government in carrying material attributed to other sources. In Peking's sole reaction to the declaration of martial law, NCNA on 26 September replayed foreign press comment critical of Marcos for resorting to martial law and called attention to demonstrations against the "Marcos authorities." The account noted the president's reference to a subversive threat in justifying martial law, but it made no mention of alleged pro-Chinese sentiments among the subversives.

In choosing to remain quiet in these delicate circumstances, Peking has suspended what had been a growing series of reports publicizing "friendly" exercises in people's diplomacy with the Philippines. Peking has also been all but silent on the Philippine communists, its last reference being a 5 December NCNA pickup of a report in the Maoist party's publication concerning battle successes of the New People's Army. The last previous reference had been a 27 April account of a party statement on the army's third anniversary. Neither report contained criticism of the Marcos government by name.

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## USSR - EGYPT

## PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ISMA'IL TALKS WITH BREZHNEV, GROMYKO

The 7-10 February visit to Moscow by Egyptian President as-Sadat's adviser for national security affairs, Hafiz Isma'il, marked the first high-level Soviet-Egyptian political discussions since Prime Minister Sidqi's talks in Moscow last October.\* The TASS and MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) announcements of the visit, on 1 February, coincided with the arrival in Cairo of a Soviet military delegation, reported by MENA but given no publicity by Moscow. The military talks presumably are a followup to the discussions in Moscow last fall during the 15-29 November visit of an Egyptian military delegation headed by the air force commander, Mubarak--a visit also unreported by Soviet media.\*\*

Cairo press comment in advance of the visit, as reported by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY on 3 February, noted that Hafiz Isma'il would be conveying a message from as-Sadat to Brezhnev. AL-JUMHURIYAH observed that the discussions, part of Egypt's "general political move," would concentrate on political and military aspects of the Middle East crisis, the "international possibilities following the recent developments in Vietnam," and the stands of "the major states" and the United Nations. According to INA, the weekly AKHBAR AL-YAWM reported "political sources in Moscow" as viewing the visit as important in reaching a "new stage for reactivating" the Middle East question.

A Moscow commentary broadcast in Arabic on 5 February, anticipating the visit, claimed that the forthcoming talks again proved the importance of Soviet-Egyptian relations to the Arabs and to the

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\* Hafiz Isma'il accompanied as-Sadat on his three public visits to Moscow in October 1971 and February and April 1972; there is no indication as to whether he was a member of as-Sadat's delegation for the secret talks early in March 1971. He was not announced as a member of Prime Minister Sidqi's entourage for the latter's July and October visits last year.

\*\* Moscow has not been consistent in publicizing exchanges of military delegations. Last December, the Iraqi defense minister's three-day "official visit"--so described by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY--went unacknowledged by Moscow, but earlier the same month an "official visit" by the Syrian defense minister was given appropriate publicity.

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"development of the Middle East situation." Perhaps in response to Egyptian press speculation about a Soviet-U.S. understanding on the Middle East, the commentary conceded that the Soviet Union and the United States want to clear the atmosphere between them, but "under no circumstances will we do this if it harms the interests of our friends." Earlier, AKHBAR AL-YAWM chief editor al-Quddus, in a 27 January article, voiced suspicion that the USSR had reached agreement with the United States at the Moscow summit under which Washington would seek an agreement in the Middle East "as has happened in Vietnam." Cairo radio, reporting Brezhnev's statement in his 30 January speech that the Vietnam settlement illustrated the possibility of peaceful solutions to other conflicts, misquoted him to the effect that the USSR "now looks forward to cooperation with the United States" in settling the Middle East crisis.

MOSCOW TALKS TASS characterized Isma'il's 7 and 9 February discussions with Gromyko as "friendly," the same description applied to Prime Minister Sidqi's October meetings with Kosygin and Podgornyy. Brezhnev--who did not meet with Sidqi last fall--received Isma'il on the 8th in a meeting which TASS called "warm and friendly." On his return home, Isma'il was reported by Cairo radio as stating that during his five-hour talk with Brezhnev various aspects of the Middle East situation and bilateral relations were reviewed with resultant "reciprocal understanding." A report on his statement broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the 11th said Isma'il described the meetings with Soviet leaders as demonstrating the understanding between the two sides "regarding the methods" of settling the Middle East problem and the promotion of friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations.

There were no public speeches during the visit; Moscow merely reported that "friendly toasts" were exchanged at Gromyko's 7 February luncheon for Isma'il and "cordial toasts" the next day at a reciprocal luncheon at the Egyptian embassy. Among the Soviet officials present at Gromyko's luncheon was the first deputy defense minister, General Kulikov, but there is no indication that he participated in the talks. That the discussions may also have touched on party relations was suggested by an IRAQI NEWS AGENCY report on the 10th stating that Egyptian newspapers said Arab Socialist Union (ASU) official Ghanim, accompanying Isma'il to Moscow, had received an invitation from a CPSU official calling on ASU Central Committee first secretary Sayyid Mar'i to visit the Soviet Union. Ghanim was reportedly also given a "draft protocol concerning cooperation between the CPSU and ASU."

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Both Moscow and Cairo media briefly noted that Isma'il met with the UN envoy to the Middle East, Dr. Jarring, while in Moscow but gave no indication of the substance of their talks.

Presumably, Isma'il renewed previous invitations to the Soviet leadership to visit Cairo, but obtained no commitment. The final paragraph of the press statement merely recorded the sides' emphasis on the importance of "holding regular contacts between the leaders" of the USSR and Egypt to exchange views and coordinate steps and actions. It added only that this practice had "proved its soundness and efficacy." The communique on Sidqi's visit last October had noted agreement to "maintain contacts between leading figures" and went on to record acceptance of as-Sadat's invitations to Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin to visit Cairo. Acceptance of invitations to the Soviet leadership had been noted in the communique on as-Sadat's October 1971 visit, and Brezhnev's acceptance of an invitation was included in the communique on as-Sadat's February 1972 visit.

**MIDEAST** In the press statement issued on the 10th, both sides  
**PROBLEM** placed standard stress on the need for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and for insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. While the October communique on Sidqi's talks mentioned Security Council Resolution 242 only in denouncing Israeli occupation in disregard of the provisions of this resolution, the current document again positively affirmed the sides' determination to struggle for a just settlement in the Middle East based on implementation of all provisions of Resolution 242.

The Soviet side again declared that in light of Israel's rejection of a "just political settlement," the Arab states "have the full right to use any form of struggle" in liberating their occupied territories. (Versions of this formula in previous Soviet-Egyptian communiques, since its introduction in the document on as-Sadat's April visit last year, have variously referred to "other means," "all means at their disposal," and "diverse means in accordance with provisions of the UN Charter.") But Moscow has continued to attribute to Cairo a commitment to a peaceful settlement: Thus Belyayev, in the commentators' roundtable broadcast on Moscow's domestic service 11 February, claimed that Isma'il's talks with Brezhnev and Gromyko "make it possible to assert that the Soviet Union together with Egypt now reaffirm their interest in the political settlement" of the problem on the basis of Resolution 242.

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The notion of an "interim" or "partial" Middle East settlement was addressed for the first time in a joint communique since July 1971. The Egyptian side separately announced its determination to seek a "full settlement" and its rejection of "any plans for a settlement on the basis of the so-called partial settlement." The Soviet side, while withholding endorsement of this position, expressed its "total understanding" of this attitude as responding to requirements of justice, the letter and spirit of UN resolutions, and the interests of peace in the Middle East. The July 1971 communique on then foreign minister Riyad's visit to Moscow declared that the problem of opening the Suez Canal for international shipping could not be solved in isolation from other problems of settlement, and should "be in context with an agreement on the withdrawal of all Israeli troops to the lines held before 5 June 1967."

Moscow's present expression of "understanding" of the Egyptian position is consistent with its previous practice of noting Egypt's position without flatly ruling out the possibility of a partial solution. A PRAVDA Observer article of 12 February last year set out Soviet objections to interim talks on a Suez Canal settlement when it decried the United States' "self-styled mediation" and questioned the value of Israel's agreement to start "indirect talks" with Cairo when it had not relinquished its territorial demands.\* Most recently, a Demchenko article in PRAVDA on 20 January recalled as-Sadat's 1971 proposal to initiate a general settlement with the resumption of Suez navigation after a partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Demchenko noted that Israeli and Western papers had said Tel Aviv might have withdrawn its troops from the eastern bank of the canal if the question of the remaining occupied lands had been "frozen." And Belyayev, in the 11 February commentators' roundtable, similarly remarked that "Western observers" stress their interest in a partial settlement because they would like to see the canal opened, but then liberation of the occupied territories "would all gradually be forgotten."

Moscow has from time to time claimed that Jordan occupies a "special place" in Israeli plans for holding direct negotiations with Arab countries in order "to impose surrender" on them separately. TASS on 9 February noted without comment King Husayn's denial of

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\* See the TRENDS of 16 February 1972, pages 33-36.

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a statement attributed to him by the Washington EVENING STAR that Jordan is prepared for separate talks with Israel, and quoted him as saying "we refuse partial settlements" and wish an overall settlement within the framework of Resolution 242.

While the Soviet-Egyptian communique stated that the sides studied the "necessary steps" for intensifying the struggle for a just settlement of the conflict, it gave no indication of the nature of such steps. The Soviets did, however, go on to pledge that they would continue political and economic support of Egypt and "facilitate a strengthening of its military potential" in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty. In praising the friendship and cooperation between Cairo and Moscow, the sides "stressed the need to give a decisive rebuff" to any attempts to weaken this "close relationship."

#### MOSCOW CIRCUMSPECT IN TREATMENT OF EGYPTIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Soviet media have for the most part ignored developments in Egypt's domestic affairs stemming from the student arrests and disturbances in early January, although PRAVDA correspondents have displayed some concern over recent trends in economic policy. Moscow has usually provided at least brief reports on major speeches by President as-Sadat, typically singling out criticism of U.S. policy and praise of Soviet-Egyptian relations. But there was no Soviet account of as-Sadat's 31 January speech to the People's Assembly, which mentioned the USSR only briefly and the United States not at all. Focusing on the student and associated problems, as-Sadat outlined an alleged plot of the "extremist left" with the tacit connivance of the "reactionary right" and charged that there had been deviations from the basic policy of the Egyptian revolution.

The subsequent 3 February announcement of the dismissal of 64 persons from membership in the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was also ignored by Moscow. But the inclusion of leftist journalist Lucif al-Khuli on a third list of dismissals prompted a brief item by TASS on the 7th noting that the ASU disciplinary commission had decided to expel "several persons" from the union, including ASU district functionaries, trade unionists, and journalists, "charged with deviating from the ASU's political line." TASS cited AL-AHRAM as reporting that those dismissed included al-Khuli, chief editor of the theoretical magazine AT-TALI'AH, and added that the disciplinary commission would continue its work. Moscow in the past had displayed some interest in al-Khuli, with Arabic-language broadcasts citing remarks by him in Beirut in January 1972.

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when he led the ASU delegation to the Lebanese CP congress, while PRAVDA in October 1971 called attention to an article he wrote in AL-AHRAM on Soviet-Arab friendship as exemplified by as-Sadat's visit that month to Moscow.

The January student disturbances in Egypt were given only minimal attention: TASS on 4 January, citing the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), reported that classes had been suspended at higher education establishments after student arrests for "instigation to rioting and violation of laws" had been followed by a strike at Cairo University, disruption of classes, and student-police clashes. TASS noted that MENA had pointed to the "unseemly role" of U.S. and Israeli radios and some "reactionary newspapers" in exploiting the student actions to undermine the Egyptian domestic front. TASS on 3 February, reporting resumption of classes, repeated this same charge--a line also taken in a 5 January Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the "tendentious attitude" of "imperialist and Zionist propaganda media" toward the Egyptian internal situation. Moscow had been similarly circumspect at the time of the student disturbances in Cairo a year ago. Thus a broadcast in Arabic on 25 January last year noted that Prime Minister Sidqi in a speech had praised the zeal of the Egyptian youth and "urged them to shift their legitimate anxiety about the country's destiny toward practical activities." The commentary had added cautiously that "zeal alone is not sufficient" and advocated knowledge and enlightened work.

PRAVDA ARTICLE PRAVDA correspondents Glukhov and Demchenko, in a Cairo dispatch in the 2 February issue, obliquely but unmistakably underscored Egyptian internal difficulties by opening their article with a description of interruptions of public services in Cairo as a result of torrential rains. They explained that the disruption of telephones, electricity and traffic was not due only to the caprices of nature "or to somebody's negligence or carelessness, although this also is not to be excluded," but could be attributed as well to financial strains brought on by the continuing Middle East stalemate. The references to the Cairo public services would be clearly understood in Egypt: Such complaints were included in the People's Assembly reply in mid-December to the government's policy statement presented by Prime Minister Sidqi in late November. Among other criticisms of the government statement, the assembly called it regrettable that "the recent torrential rains paralyzed our most important utilities; this does not reassure us." And President as-Sadat, in his 31 January

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speech, implicitly referred to the assembly criticism when he abruptly mentioned "the rain" and "the telephones" and referred to "the acute transportation crisis," the need for overhaul of the sewage network and "many things."

The PRAVDA correspondents indicated concern over recent measures to increase private investment in the economy as well as to invite foreign--Arab and Western--capital. The article cited the Egyptian journal AT-TALI'AH as pointing out that the proportion of the private sector in the total volume of industrial production was growing at a relatively faster rate than the state sector, and the correspondents remarked that "the bourgeoisie plainly feels more assured."

As for the basic problem of the Israeli occupation, PRAVDA's correspondents said they encountered a "quite wide" range of opinions in conversations and in press articles as to how the occupied lands should be liberated. They noted that the most frequently voiced view was that efforts in the political sphere "should be backed up by other means at the Arab countries' disposal." Glukhov and Demchenko remarked that as-Sadat's appeal to the Egyptians "to 'be ready for the battle for liberation' has met with the approval of many."

OTHER COMMUNIST  
REACTION

A Budapest domestic service commentary on 3 January recalled student frustrations in Egypt a year earlier over the "indecisiveness of the 'year of decision'," as President as-Sadat had described the year 1971. It noted that the students had again become active when "it became obvious that because of internal strife among various groups vying for power," efforts to settle the Mideast crisis were being relegated to the background. The commentary added that internal conflicts "reached the boiling point first" in the army, and although army demands for assistance to Syria, for example, were confined within narrow limits, they were indicative of the "disquiet and impatience." Budapest concluded that army and student demands for action are unfounded, since Egypt is in no position to regain its territories by military force and, in any case, the Egyptian leadership "has given priority to a political settlement." But it criticized the regime's practice of creating more committees instead of taking more "effective" measures.

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The Lebanese CP has also been critical of Cairo policies. The weekly AL-AKHBAR in a 27 January article charged that while Egyptian official sources had declared their rejection of "the new Rogers initiative," the way the Egyptian regime was tackling the situation did not suggest that it wanted to take the "natural step of action and decisiveness." The paper further complained that the Cairo regime did not follow the policy of placing the country on the road of the battle, mobilizing the capabilities of the masses, "safeguarding the necessary conditions for utilizing the aid of the friend," confronting Arab reaction "instead of reaching an understanding with it," and striking at imperialist interests instead of trying to court imperialism.

And the Lebanese CP daily AN-NIDA', in an 8 February article, expressed surprise at the ASU decision to dismiss "an elite group of Egyptian democratic intellectuals." The paper called it illogical and objectionable to accuse these intellectuals of having interfered with the students and to accuse the students in turn of accepting "such 'foreign elements.'" It praised the past struggles of the intellectuals as well as their recent attitudes during the debate in Egypt over a "program of conciliation with U.S. imperialism and Arab reaction."

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## DOLLAR DEVALUATION

## MOSCOW, ALLIES PICTURE TROUBLED WESTERN FINANCIAL RELATIONS

Moscow has portrayed the devaluation of the dollar on 12 February as an attempt by the United States to shift the burden of current financial difficulties resulting from economic and military expansion onto the shoulders of its trade partners in Western Europe and Japan. Commentaries in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and other Soviet media on the currency crisis and devaluation--like those on previous difficulties in Western financial relations--have emphasized that disagreements continue among members of the newly enlarged European Economic Community (EEC) as well as between the Community and the United States. Noting that the same solution was tried in December 1971, most comment has concluded that the recent devaluation will be no more successful than the earlier move in solving the crisis, since the root of the problem--the dollar's position as the "crown currency"--has not been confronted.

Moscow has emphasized that further "unilateral" measures in trade policy are likely to issue from Washington, but it has focused on their likely impact on relations among Western nations while skirting the issue of the implications of either the devaluation or subsequent measures for U.S.-Soviet trade relations. The government paper IZVESTIYA reported on 14 February an announcement of the USSR State Bank that "in connection with the devaluation of the U.S. dollar," the ruble-dollar exchange rate had been set at 74 rubles 61 kopeks per 100 dollars.

MOSCOW'S ALLIES  
IN EAST EUROPE

A relatively small volume of comment from Moscow's East European allies, principally from East Germany, has generally echoed the Soviet line that the devaluation represents an attempt by Washington to shift the burden of its financial difficulties onto its trading partners. East Berlin, more blatantly than the others, has placed additional stress on portrayal of a crisis-prone capitalist economy in comparison with a stable socialist system.

The East German party daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 13th, in an editorial entitled "Imperialist Currency Crisis," contrasted the "healthy" economies of the socialist currencies with "chaos" in the Western capitalist countries allegedly triggered by

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U.S. global strategy epitomized by the Vietnam war. A GDR domestic service commentary the same day predicted that the current devaluation would be no more successful than the December 1971 measures and that the "crisis" of the "fatally ill system" would continue. Reaction from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Poland has generally avoided or soft pedaled the socialism-versus-capitalism theme but has pictured a hopelessly crisis-ridden U.S. economy, suffering from the effects of the Vietnam war, taking steps to shift the burden of its troubles onto America's allies.

The Polish Government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY used the occasion of the U.S. difficulties for a favorable portrayal of the "solidarity" of the EEC member countries in the crisis, a solidarity "neither anticipated by Americans nor, to tell the truth, by European observers." The paper said the crisis shows that the United States "has ceased to be the first among equals" and that its currency has turned out to be no better but rather worse than the yen, the West German mark, "or even the despised franc."

TIRANA A relatively moderate commentary carried by the Tirana radio on the 13th predicted that "the U.S. financial position will be improved to the disadvantage of the other Western countries," but that the devaluation will ultimately fail because of "the crisis that has embraced the capitalist world in all fields--economic, political, military, and ideological."

BELGRADE TANJUG noted in a Washington dispatch on the 12th the "interesting circumstance" that the current trade mission of Yugoslav Vice Premier Sirotkovic to the U.S. capital coincided with the monetary crisis and reported without comment the U.S. rationale for the devaluation. In a commentary the next day, a Yugoslav domestic radio commentator saw "the sickly dollar" as symptomatic of the approaching demise of capitalism.

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## EUROPE FORCE CUTS

## SOVIET BLOC MEDIA INSIST VIENNA TALKS ARE MAKING PROGRESS

Moscow and its East European partners have been attempting, in limited public comment on the Vienna preparatory talks on European force reductions, to quell speculation in the Western press that the closed-door talks are deadlocked. In an apparently orchestrated effort on 7 and 8 February in particular, statements by various East European delegates at the talks and commentaries carried in Moscow, Sofia, Prague, East Berlin, Budapest, and Warsaw media rejected pessimistic reports being disseminated in the West and insisted that despite their inherently complex nature, the talks have been held in a "constructive" atmosphere and are making progress.

While the statements by delegates and delegation spokesmen, carried in the respective East European press services, were confined largely to generalities about the atmosphere of the Vienna talks, commentaries in Soviet as well as East European media have noted that the main difficulty has been the inability of the Warsaw Pact and NATO conferees to agree on the status that countries participating in the Vienna talks should have in future formal negotiations. There has been no explicit acknowledgment, however, that the status of Hungary and Italy has become a major divisive issue. These commentaries have pointed out that the main difference between the two blocs is that NATO wants to limit the participation of certain states in any future force reduction negotiations, while the socialist states want to open the doors for the "widest" possible participation.

At the same time, some of the comment has come closer to the heart of Moscow's real concerns. For example, a dispatch by Radio Moscow's Vienna correspondent V. Baskakov, broadcast on 7 February, emphasized that "naturally" when the time comes for actual negotiations the "real decisions" will be made by the countries which will be reducing their armed forces. And in a Budapest radio interview on the same day, the military affairs correspondent for the Hungarian weekly MAGYARORSZAG, Istvan Kormendy--who has served on past occasions as a proxy spokesman for Moscow on sensitive strategic military issues--observed that where "NATO is afraid of the favorable political effort a wide-ranging political consultation would create," the socialist states "have from the outset taken the stand that the substantive talks themselves would be conducted by the states directly involved; so there would be an exclusive and confidential forum for serious negotiations."

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## BODYUL RECOMMENDS OPERATIONAL POWERS FOR KOLKHOZ COUNCILS

In the wake of the removal of V.V. Matskevich as USSR agriculture minister,\* Moldavian First Secretary I.I. Bodyul has proposed an expansion of the rights of kolkhoz councils along lines envisioned by advocates of the controversial kolkhoz union scheme in the late 1950's and 1960's. Unlike the abortive kolkhoz unions, which were conceived by their supporters as "elective" agencies of agricultural administration capable of supplanting the agriculture ministry and its local agencies, the kolkhoz councils were formed in 1969 as strictly advisory bodies lacking powers of administration or coordination of kolkhoz affairs. To ensure subordination of the councils to the agriculture bureaucracy, an "elective" USSR Council of Kolkhozes was established in Moscow under the chairmanship of Matskevich, the most outspoken foe of kolkhoz unions, and its network of "elective" regional and local councils was headed by officials of the agriculture ministry.

Addressing a meeting in a Moldavian kolkhoz reported by Kishinev radio on 9 February, Bodyul proposed that the kolkhoz councils be granted rights of operational management of kolkhozes and interkolkhoz associations, and he claimed CPSU Central Committee support for his proposal. Although Bodyul did not mention kolkhoz unions, he has long been one of their advocates, most notably in his June 1967 ECONOMIC GAZETTE article and his 30 October 1969 speech to the Moldavian congress of kolkhozniks, and the idea of kolkhoz unions has been popular in Moldavia as well as in the Ukraine.

The implications for the agriculture ministry were left unclear by Bodyul's proposal. The ministry has been under heavy attack for ineffective leadership during the past year, and it was markedly weakened by the formation of a RSFSR Ministry of Sovkhozes last February. At the same time, efforts have been made--in the face of opposition--to strengthen the kolkhoz councils as a means of improving the administration and coordination of the proliferating network of interkolkhoz organizations in such fields as construction, cattle fattening,

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\* For background on Matskevich's ouster, see the 7 February 1973 TRENDS, pages 22-24.

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food processing, and the like. The replacement of Matskevich by Polyanskiy, a leading proponent of kolkhoz unions in the Khrushchev era, may presage a further weakening of the ministry to the benefit of the surrogate "elective" agencies of agricultural administration.

**KOLKHOZ UNIONS** The issue of kolkhoz unions became topical in the late 1950's with Khrushchev, Polyanskiy, Podgornyy and Kirilenko favoring powerful unions at the national and local levels and Matskevich opposing anything but powerless unions at the local level. At the December 1959 CPSU plenum Polyanskiy called for the creation of kolkhoz unions to assume operational management of kolkhoz and interkolkhoz affairs at the expense of a "substantially reduced" agriculture ministry. Although this proposal failed to gain approval, Matskevich was ousted as agriculture minister in December 1960 and his ministry was stripped of much of its power. After Khrushchev's fall, Matskevich returned as minister and the ministry regained much of its lost power.

The kolkhoz union movement was revived after the March 1965 plenum, where Brezhnev proposed the convocation of the long delayed congress of kolkhozniks for the purpose of preparing a new kolkhoz charter. At the 23d CPSU Congress in March 1966 Brezhnev cautiously tabled the kolkhoz union issue and was backed by Shelest, Pelshe, Podgornyy, and various minor figures. The debate that ensued after the congress was in low key, and the only prominent figures to support kolkhoz unions publicly were Bedyul and Brezhnev's agricultural assistant Golikov in 1967.

**KOLKHOZ COUNCILS** The debate resurfaced in 1969 in connection with the decision to hold the congress of kolkhozniks at the end of that year. However, the issue won less support than in 1966, chiefly because the Ukrainian leaders failed to endorse it, and when the congress convened in November the term "kolkhoz unions" disappeared. Instead Brezhnev and Polyanskiy proposed the creation of "kolkhoz councils" with solely advisory powers. When Matskevich became head of the new council and agriculture ministry officials were placed in charge of the hierarchy of "elective" councils at lower levels, it was evident that the new agencies were intended to serve as adjuncts of the agricultural bureaucracy.

Only a handful of kolkhoz union advocates ventured to complain in print after 1969. Their complaints usually centered on the impotence of the councils, their inability to adopt decisions on

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practical problems of production. The issue was raised directly only by Yu. I. Krasnopoyas in an obscure economic journal in early 1971. Criticizing kolkhoz councils as merely "consultative" organs under the agriculture ministry and attacking the concentration of administrative functions in the agricultural and other state organs, he urged decentralization of kolkhoz administration in the form of kolkhoz unions. The proposal was ignored, however, and at a March 1971 Moscow meeting of the USSR Council of Kolkhozes ministry officials attacked some councils for infringing on the ministry's prerogatives by attempting to discuss production questions. A statute was adopted which clearly defined the advisory nature of the councils, and Matskevich and his ministry officials acquired even tighter control of the USSR council.

1972 SHIFT But by early 1972 the ministry's position had markedly weakened, and signs of movement in the direction of strengthening the councils began to appear. The creation of a RSFSR Ministry of Sovkhozes in February 1972 indirectly undercut the anti-kolkhoz union forces, since it divided sovkhov and kolkhoz administration into separate systems. In the past one of the main arguments of kolkhoz union foes was that all farms should be administered by a single agency and that a separate kolkhoz union system would disrupt agricultural administration. The rapid proliferation of specialized sovkhov trusts and associations in recent years and the creation of sovkhov ministries in several republics to administer these trusts placed the system of sovkhozes outside the agriculture ministry's jurisdiction. By the same token, it paved the way for the establishment of a parallel kolkhoz structure.

New forms of kolkhoz administration have also proliferated, especially in Moldavia. In the central press Bodyul actively promoted the formation of agro-industrial complexes and interkolkhoz and sovkhov-kolkhoz production associations, and in a May 1971 KOMMUNIST article Brezhnev's assistant Golikov singled out Moldavia's innovative interkolkhoz organizations for praise. It is noteworthy that only three weeks before his ouster, Matskevich took the unusual step of visiting Moldavia to study its organizational innovations and to be lectured by Bodyul on their advantages.

Pressure on the agriculture ministry to accept new organizational forms continued to grow in 1972. The sharpest jolt came from Gosplan First Deputy Chairman T.I. Sokolov, who declared in the June PLANNED ECONOMY that the agriculture ministry in its present

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form could not effectively lead agriculture, praised the new sovkhos ministries, and urged that kolkhoz councils be given rights to decide production questions. At the same time, however, PRAVDA appeared to reflect a contrary view, stressing in its 19 June editorial that the councils should "not duplicate or replace agricultural organs."

When some kolkhoz councils undertook to expand their functions in 1972, they were not rebuked as before. At a 28-29 June RSFSR Council of Kolkhozes meeting, reported in the October ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, the Bashkir agriculture minister advocated more rights for the kolkhoz councils. An 18 July session of the Ukrainian Council of Kolkhozes, reported in the RABOCHAYA GAZETA the following day, complained about the difficulty of coordinating 6,000 local interkolkhoz organizations in the Ukraine and recommended their centralization under local kolkhoz councils. Nikolayev Oblast Kolkhoz Council Chairman I. Yastreb described in the 27 September PRAVDA how, upon the recommendation of the Ukrainian Council of Kolkhozes, his council had placed most of the oblast's interkolkhoz organizations under the jurisdiction of the oblast and rayon kolkhoz councils.

Perhaps sensing a shift in official opinion on the issue, even agriculture ministry officials began conceding the need to strengthen the councils. In the 30 August PRAVDA V. Yakushev, chief of the RSFSR Agriculture Ministry's main administration for kolkhoz affairs, even while criticizing councils for assuming functions not authorized by law, noted that many council members desired greater rights and conceded that administration of interkolkhoz organizations by kolkhoz councils was justified.

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